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The Perceived Effectiveness of the 
Officer Certification Requirement 
under Sarbanes-Oxley 
T. Jean Engebretson' and Heidi Hylton Meier' 
IFairnlOnt State University 
'Cleveland State University 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought about sweeping 
changes that were meant to improve corporate reporting in the 
United States and to restore investor confidence following 
some of the largest business failures in US history. This study 
examines one requirement of this legislation, the certification 
of the financial statements by the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) by surveying 
stakeholder constituent groups to determine whether this new 
requirement is effective in accomplishing the goals established 
by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). This is accomplished by using Cameron's strategic 
constituencies model to test seven research questions 
developed from the current literature which provides various 
points of view regarding the appropriateness of the CEO/CFO 
certification. Based on the results of these tests, we see that 
there are significant differences among the perceptions of the 
constituent groups as to the effectiveness of this requirement. 
Key words: Accounting, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 302, CEO 
certification, CFO certification, audit, internal control, investor 
confidence, audit quality, corporate governance 
SUMMARY 
A major goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was 
to improve corporate reporting in the United States 
so as to restore investor confidence and stabilize 
the credit markets following major business 
failures in the US. One of the requirements of this 
law was to make officers more accountable through 
the certification of the financial statements by the 
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Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO). Although the literature 
provided some discussion of this new requirement, 
there had been very little empirical evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of this new rule. This 
study attempts to fill that void and examines the 
effectiveness of this requirement by using a 
questionnaire to survey stakeholder groups 
(accounting educators, certified public accountants, 
internal auditors, bankers, and certified financial 
analysts) to determine how well each of these 
groups felt that this requirement would be in 
improving the quality of corporate reporting. 
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After a thorough examination of the current 
literature and Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, seven research questions were developed 
and were tested using Cameron's strategic 
constituencies model in which we determined 
whether there were any differences among the 
perceptions of the constituent groups as to the 
effectiveness of this requirement. In conclusion, 
bankers differed with the other constituent groups 
in that they were more negative on most of their 
views, especially concerning the purpose of the 
requirement and specifically, that they have little 
confidence that the certification requirement will 
improve corporate reporting. In contrast, 
accounting educators were much more positive 
in their views, and in general believe that people 
and society can be changed through laws and 
regulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of one of the most notorious fraud 
schemes in recent memory, Enron Corporation 
filed for bankruptcy in early December 2001. 
Not surprisingly, the corporation's collapse was 
followed by several years of Congressional 
investigation and legal prosecution. During one 
such investigation, Jeffrey Skilling, a past Enron 
CEO, tes tified before the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee. During this testimony, Mr 
Skilling stated that 'he was unaware of any 
accounting practices designed to hide debt or 
make the company look more solvent than it really 
was' ('Lay may testify', 2002). Naturally, it is 
difficult to believe that the CEO of a major 
corporation could be that clueless about the 
operation of his own company; so unknowing, in 
fact, that 'others' could have perpetrated one of 
the largest contemporary fraud schemes right 
under his very nose while he remained completely 
unaware of it. 
While it is not surprising that an individual 
accused of fraud or embezzlement would be less 
than forthcoming regarding their culpability in a 
fraud scheme, it is remarkable that so many of 
these individuals ultimately choose to blame the 
accountant while also claiming that they are 
unwitting victims themselves. Even though the 
'I-am-not-an-accountant-so-I-am-not-responsible' 
defense may not be particularly credible, it has 
been specifically addressed in the reforms set forth 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act requires 
the CEO and CFO to certify that financial results 
are not false or misleading. Specifically, the 
principal executive and financial officers must 
'certify' each annual and quarterly report that is 
filed under the Act that: 
1. 	 ll1ey have reviewed the report; 
2. 	 The report does not contain any material false 
statements or any material omissions of fact 
that would make it misleading, given their 
personal knowledge of the report; and 
3. 	 The financial information included in the 
report presents fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position and results of operations 
of the company, given their personal 
knowledge of the company's performance. 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 302, p. 37) 
In addition to the report certification, the officers 
must also attest to the condition of the system of 
internal controls. Specifically, the CEO and CFO 
must assert that: 
1. 	 It is their responsibility to design and maintain 
the internal control system so that it will 
generate important information that will be 
communicated to the appropriate corporate 
officer for action; 
2. 	They have evaluated said internal control 
system for effectiveness within 90 days of the 
financial reporti and 
3. 	 They have issued a report regarding their 
conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the 
internal control system. The report must also 
include any Significant manges to that system 
after the evaluation was made. (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Section 302, p. 37) 
Finally, the CEO and CFO must certify that they 
have clisclosed to the auditor and the audit 
committee of the board of directors all Significant 
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the 
internal control structure and any fraud cases 
involving employees who are key components in 
the internal control system (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Section 302, p. 37). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a considerable amount published 
about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Some authors have 
discussed the reasons for the legislation (Rezaee, 
2005) and others have provided practical advice on 
the implementation of the law. Several authors 
have raised questions regarding whether new laws 
and regulations can achieve what prior laws and 
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regulations could not (Ronen & Berman, 2004; 
Romano, 2005). While many of these authors are 
quite skeptical (Ribstein, 2002; Heeren & Rieckers, 
2003) about how successful Sarbanes-Oxley will be 
in addressing the issues that Congress had hoped 
to resolve, some are optimistic that the financial 
reporting process will be improved (Geiger & 
Taylor, 2003; Klein, 2003). 
Although there has been much written about the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, most of this work has been 
presented without empirical results. However, 
there are a few research studies to note. Kinney 
et al. (2004) conducted a study regarding the 
services that are prohibited by the Act. The authors 
contended that there was no empirical justification 
by Congress or the SEC to prove that such services 
impair audit quality and they provide empirical 
evidence on 289 firms that restated their financial 
statements to determine any effects of proViding 
non-audit services. They concluded that 
prohibiting financial services design but allowing 
tax services may improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 
Nagy and Cenker (2007) surveyed Chief Audit 
Executives from 17 publicly held Northeast Ohio 
companies to determine the effect of Section 404 
compliance on the internal audit profession. Their 
results showed that short-term benefits include 
improved job security, increased compensation, 
and greater visibility within the organization. 
However, the authors question whether these 
short-run benefits will have long-term costs by 
turning these departments into compliance units 
that require less professional judgment and 
expertise, concluding that perhaps organizations 
should form compliance groups to handle these 
new requirements so that internal auditors can 
resume their activities that add value and improve 
their organization's operations. Bryan (2009) and 
Bryan et al. (2008) interviewed high ranking 
corporate managers and analyzed their team 
approach to comply with Section 404 requirements 
of Sarbanes-Oxley and noted differences in their 
approaches. 
The results of the current study, while 
exploratory in nature, provide additional empirical 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of Sarbanes­
Oxley by examining one part of the law, the 
certifications that are required by the CEOs and 
CFOs. By seeking the views of several different 
stakeholders, we attempt to determine whether 
this additional measure is perceived to enhance the 
reporting process. 
RESEARCH STUDY 
As a corporate governance mechanism, it 
appears that the purpose of the CEO certification 
requirement is to make corporate officers 
personally responSible for the financial information 
that is disseminated about their company. Gone are 
the days when the corporate officer can disavow 
any knowledge of wrongdoing and blame it solely 
on the accountant. Now, officers are required to be 
knowledgeable about internal control procedures 
and material weaknesses as well as accounting 
principles and professional codes of conduct. 
Much has been written in the financial press 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of 
the certification requirement. Some authors state 
that the requirement was necessary in order to 
give investors the requisite level of comfort to 
invest in the market after the collapse of Enron 
(Marden et aI., 2003; Fornelli, 2007). Others believe 
that it will help corporations become more control 
conscious as well as aiding in the risk 
identification process (McConnell & Banks, 2003; 
Henry, 2007). On the other hand, the process 
involved with certification will be arduous and 
time consuming and it is quite possible that the 
cost of the certification could outweigh its benefits 
(McConnell & Banks, 2003; Grady, 2007; Scannell, 
2007; Wilcox, 2007). Even if executive officers 
manage to complete the procedures necessary for 
certification, it may be impossible for them to 
attest to the information required by the Act. The 
officer may be incapable of actually knowing that 
there are no improprieties at some distant 
operations (Avellanet, 2003). 
It seems that there are various points of view 
regarding the appropriateness of the CEO/CFO 
certification requirement to improve corporate 
governance in US companies. To measure 
effectiveness, a study based on a survey of the Act's 
constituents was conducted to determine the level 
of agreement on the following set of research 
questions which were derived from a review of 
prior literature: 
RQl: The constituent groups will agree that 
the CEO / CFO certification requirement gives 
investors a greater sense of comfort follOWing the 
Enron collapse. 
RQ2: The constituent groups will agree that 
the CEO / CFO certification requirement helps 
corporations become better at identifying risks 
and controlling operations. 
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RQ3: The constituent groups will agree that the 
CEOjCFO certification requirement will ensure 
that no false or misleading financial statements 
will be issued by corporations. 
RQ4: The constituent groups will agree that 
the CEO j CFO certification requirement was 
unnecessary because the same statements are 
made to the auditor in the management 
representation letter. 
RQ5: The constituent groups will agree that the 
costs of the CEOjCFO certification requirement 
will outweigh its benefits. 
RQ6: The constituent groups will agree that the 
CEOs and CFOs cannot know what is happening 
at all their operations, especially in large, 
multinational companies. 
RQ7: TI1e constituent groups will agree that the 
CEOjCFO certification requirement will induce 
CEOs and CFOs to create new methods to shield 
their personal assets from potential liability. 
The following discussion proVides an overview 
of how the literature was used in the development 
of these research questions. The first research 
question was derived based on the premise that 
there is some sentin1ent that the Act was solely a 
political gesture to make investors feel better 
(Marden et al., 2003). Therefore, this question is 
used to determine whether or not the CEOjCFO 
certification indeed gives investors a greater sense 
of comfort after the Enron disaster. The second 
question is based on the belief that the officer 
certification requirement will, in fact, help publicly 
traded corporations identify risks and become 
more control conscious (McConnell & Banks, 2003). 
Most importantly, from the Act itself, it is stated that 
the overall purpose is to improve the transparency 
and accuracy of corporate reporting. Hence, in 
RQ3, the query is whether the CEOjCFO 
certification requirement would ensure that the 
financial report was accurate. 
Some authors stated that the CEOjCFO 
certification was unnecessary due to the assertions 
already made in the representation letter (Marden 
et aI., 2003) or due to its excessive cost in both 
time and money (McConnell & Banks, 2003). The 
fourth research question was based on these 
studies as was RQ5, focusing on the cost of 
certification and whether it would outweigh its 
benefits given the time-consuming effort required 
to generate it. 
Finally, the last two research questions dealt with 
the more pragmatic issues of the certification 
requirement Some authors have stated that it will 
be in1possible to be certain that the information 
generated in distant locations is accurate 
(Avellanet, 2003). Therefore, the sixth research 
question asks if it is even possible for the CEO j 
CFO to know if the information is accurate, 
especially the information generated at distant 
operations. The last question, RQ7, concerns the all 
too human desire of officers to protect themselves. 
The certification requirement makes executives 
personally liable for false information included in 
the report. As a result, officers may need to devise 
methods that can be used to shield their personal 
assets in the event malfeasance is discovered in the 
report (Marden et aI., 2003) and this question 
focuses on the effect the certification requirement 
will have on a company's officials. 
Measuring effectiveness 
There are several models available to measure 
effectiveness. However, each one struggles with 
the problem of defining 'effectiveness' as 'effective' 
means different things to different people at 
different times. Researchers always want to 
develop a comprehensive list of indicators or 
predictors that can be applied to any situation to 
measure the effectiveness of an organization or 
system. It is possible that attempting to create such 
a comprehensive list of effectiveness predictors is a 
futile endeavor. According to Cameron, 'consensus 
regarding the best, or sufficient, set of indicators of 
effectiveness is impossible to obtain. Criteria are 
based on the values and preferences of individuals 
and no specifiable construct boundaries exist' 
(Cameron, 1986, p. 541). A model specifically based 
on this notion that each individual measures 
effectiveness differently is known as the strategic 
constituencies model. In this model, effectiveness 
is determined by how well 'all strategic 
constituencies are at least minimally satisfied' 
(Cameron, 1986, p. 542). There are several 
variations of this model (e.g., relativism, power, 
social justice, evolutionary, etc.). Yet, each variation 
of the model has a core component that states 
effectiveness is evaluated by how well the interests 
of various constituencies have been satisfied. Any 
individual or groups of individuals with a stake in 
the organization or system is considered to be a 
constituent of the system (Gibson et aI., 1997). 
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This model has been useful in evaluating 
effectiveness in those cases where there are few 
concrete or measurable goals, objectives, or outputs 
(see Alam et al., 2000; Engebretson, 2006). 
The social test [is] to be the most suitable for 
those units that cannot be measured with 
absolute empirical standards due to ... the lack 
of clear measurable outputs. The effectiveness of 
these units can be assessed meaningfully only by 
the opinion of some referent groups. (Tsui, 1990, 
p.459) 
Consequently, the constituencies model seems 
especially appropriate for measuring the 
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its 
components. The Act is a broad legislative measure 
with a stated purpose of improving audit quality, 
financial reporting quality, and corporate 
governance procedures. As such, it has impacted 
many diverse groups in the financial reporting 
process including investors, creditors, certified 
public accountants (CPAs), public accounting 
firms, audit committees, managers, officers, and 
directors of publicly traded companies. One can 
assume that each different constituency will 
have been impacted differently by the Act. If 
so, then each constituent group would view 
the effectiveness of the Act differently based on the 
personal experience of the constituents with the 
provisions of the Act and the execution of those 
provisions. 
A key postulate of the multiple constituency 
model is that the organization is usually not able 
to satisfy the interests of different constituencies 
Simultaneously. . . . In other words, the 
predictors of effectiveness, strategic or 
environmental, may vary with different 
constituencies. (Tsui, 1989, p. 188) 
If each different constituent group can be expected 
to have a different opinion of the effectiveness of 
the certification requirement, the agreement of 
different constituencies on the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the certification requirement 
would provide some support for the effectiveness 
of the certification requirement in improving 
corporate governance procedures in the US. 
It should be noted, however, that this study will 
only assess one measurement of tl1e effectiveness 
construct. It is not, nor does it purport to be, the 
only or even the best measure of effectiveness. 
In fact, one of the best measurements of the 
effectiveness of the Act would be to compare the 
number of fraudulent financial statements 
published before the passage of the officer 
certification requirement to the number published 
after the requirement became enacted. 
Unfortunately, publicly traded companies do not 
advertise that they are publishing fraudulent 
financial statements. It is unlikely that any 
company would openly admit to such activity in a 
researcher's study. Misstatements can occur for 
years before they are detected by the financial 
community. As a result, a more direct measurement 
of effectiveness seems unavailable at this time and 
instead, this research study will use the multiple 
constituencies model to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the CEO / CFO certification requirement as 
expressed by the constituent groups impacted by 
the Act. 
Constituent groups defined 
This study will examine whether various 
stakeholder groups are in agreement regarding 
their belief about the effectiveness of the CEO/ 
CFO certification requirement to improve 
corporate governance. The results of the study will 
greatly depend upon the constituent groups that 
are identified and included in the research study. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a sweeping reform 
package with stated designs on improving 
corporate reporting in the US. It is imperative 
to consider the views of public accountants and 
corporate management, who are the two 
constituent groups most affected by this legislation. 
In addition, the Act has a stated goal of protecting 
the investing public, and therefore, users of 
financial statements are also included in the study. 
Consequently, the constituent groups to be 
included in fue study are accountants, corporate 
management, and financial statement users. 
Instrument design 
The research instrument is a survey that was 
developed through an examination of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, auclit quality literature, and 
critiques of the Act in the financial press. In 
addition to the seven research questions that were 
previously discussed, standard demographic data 
were requested from each participant as well as an 
evaluation of fueir level of knowledge about the 
Act. For purposes of control, a respondent was 
asked to rate his or her familiarity with the Act. As 
the results of the survey would be meaningless if 
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Table 1: Response rate 
Bankers CFAs CPAs Educators Internal Total 
auditors 
Total responses 53 48 65 66 90 322 
Less: unusable responses (2) (1) (5) (4) (2) (14) 
Usable responses 51 47 60 62 88 308 
Final response rate 17.59% 13.78% 21.13% 21.38% 30.34% 20.60% 
the respondent has no knowledge of the Act, those 
surveys were excluded from the data analysis if the 
participant stated that he or she was unfamiliar 
with the Act. 
As the survey questions used in this paper were 
developed expressly for this research study, the 
validity of the survey questions to actually measure 
the construct under study was first established. The 
survey questions were first evaluated for content 
by CPA practitioners. The results of this pre-test 
were used to revise, format, and condense 
the survey instrument. A pilot study of the 
formatted questionnaire was then conducted of 
CPA practitioners, bankers, and internal auditors. 
Revisions to the survey instrument were again 
made as a result of the feedback from the pilot 
study. 
Survey implementation and response rate 
The constituent groups to be included in the study 
are accountants, corporate management, and 
financial statement users. The accountant 
constituent group was represented by CPAs and 
accounting educators. The financial statement user 
constituent group was represented by chartered 
financial analysts (CFAs) representing the investor 
category of financial statement users and bankers 
representing creditors. Finally, the corporate 
management group was represented by internal 
auditors. 
A total of 1,600 surveys were administered by 
mail to the stakeholder groups listed above. Steps 
were taken to improve the response rate of the 
survey including a personalized cover letter, a 
reminder postcard, and a second request mailing. 
In addition, the survey instrument itself was 
designed to appear short and easy to complete. A 
total of 63 surveys were marked 'return to sender' 
and 42 surveys were returned by individuals who 
no longer worked in the relevant profeSSion, so the 
final survey consisted of a total of 1,495 potential 
research subjects. 
The response for this survey is presented in 
Table 1. A total of 322 surveys were returned. Of 
those, 14 were not useful for data analYSiS, 
primarily due to missing data, resulting in a 
response rate of almost 21%. In addition, a test for 
non-response bias was conducted on the survey 
data. The 308 usable responses from the survey 
were divided into two groups: early responders 
and late responders. The responses of the late 
responders are assumed to be similar to those of 
non-respondents for this survey (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977). A test of means was conducted on 
the variables from the survey questions of 
relevance to this paper to determine any significant 
differences in the means of the two groups. No 
significant differences were found in any of the 
variables and, consequently, this would suggest 
that there is not a significant level of non-response 
bias in the sample. 
RESULTS 
Demographics 
Demographic data was requested of each 
respondent, including age, gender, education level, 
professional credentials, profeSSion, and years 
employed in the profeSSion. The information for 
each constituent group appears in Table 2. Overall, 
nearly 80 percent (243) of the individuals 
responding to the survey were male and 76 percent 
(234) of the respondents were between the ages 
of 40 and 60. Individually, it would appear 
that bankers and CFAs represent the youngest 
constituents (22 percent and 25 percent under 39 
years old, respectively). Of the total respondents, 
approXimately 40 percent (122) had a bachelor's 
degree and 41 percent (126) had a master's degree. 
Most of the survey participants have a CPA license 
(69 percent or 202 respondents). 
Other information was requested regarding 
the respondent's employer characteristics. These 
included the employer's primary industry and total 
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Table 2: Demographic information 
Bankers CFAs CPAs Educators 1ntenIaI 
(n = 51) (n = 47) (n = 60) (n = 62) auditors 
(n =88) 
Gender 
Male 39 (76%) 41 (87%) 47 (78%) 39 (63%) 77 (88%) 
Female 12 (24%) 6 (13%) 13 (22%) 23 (37%) 11 (12%) 
Age 
<30 yrs 1 (2%) 3 (6%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 1 (1%) 
30-39 yrs 10 (20%) 9 (19%) 0(0%) 5 (8%) 4 (5%) 
40-49 yrs 16 (31%) 15 (32%) 21 (35%) 18 (29%) 43 (49%) 
50-59 yrs 17 (33%) 12 (26%) 27 (45%) 27 (44%) 38 (43%) 
>60 yrs 7 (14%) 8 (17%) 11 (18%) 9 (14%) 2 (2%) 
Education 
Bachelor's 34 (66%) 10 (21%) 37 (62%) 0(0%) 41 (47%) 
Master's 
Other 
10 (20%) 
7 (14%) 
34 (73%) 
3 (6%) 
20 (33%) 
3 (5%) 
17 (27%) 
45 (73%) 
45 (51%) 
2 (2%) 
Years in the profession 
<10 yrs 5 (10%) 10 (21%) 3 (5%) 18 (29%) 14 (16%) 
10-20 yrs 15 (29%) 17 (36%) 12 (20%) 25 (40%) 38 (43%) 
21-30 yrs 21 (41 %) 12 (26%) 27 (45%) 13 (21%) 29 (33%) 
>30 yrs 10 (20%) 8 (17%) 18 (30%) 6 (10%) 7 (8%) 
number of people employed. The primary 
Industries reported by participants Included 
colleges/universities (19 percent), banking (19 
percent), public accounting (18 percent), and 
financial services consulting (14 percent). Most of 
the employers were either small businesses with 
less than 100 employees (34 percent) or large 
employers with more than 1,000 employees (31 
percent). 
Pro-certification questions 
Three questions in the survey instrument were 
investigating the perceptions of the more positive 
aspects of the CEO/CFO certification requirement. 
Specifically, the survey asked participants if the 
requirement would give investors a greater sense 
of comfort following the Enron collapse, if it would 
improve the entity's risk identification process and 
control consciousness, and if the requirement 
would ensure that the report does not contain any 
material untrue statement or omission of fact. 
Responses were recorded on a five-pOint 
Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly 
disagree). 
Results were evaluated using the one-way or 
Single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the 
responses for each of the research questions. 
ANOVA is a commonly used procedure for testing 
the equality of the means for more than two 
populations. The equality of means was tested by 
comparing two estimates of the variance common 
to the separate populations (variance between the 
samples and variance within the samples) (Triola, 
2007). It is an appropriate statistical test for this 
type of analysis because it: (i) examlnes differences 
In the sample average for more than one group; (ii) 
does not require the samples to be of equal size; 
and (iii) uses samples that are simple random 
samples that are Independent of one another and 
are categorized In only one way (Triola, 2007) 
(constituent groups). 
FolloWing the ANOVA, the calculation of a 
significant F-test was used to Indicate if a 
statistical difference In the means exists. However, 
it does not identify which means are different, 
and In order to identify which groups have 
different means, additional testing is required. 
Although there are several methods available, 
the Scheffe test was chosen for this study. The 
Scheffe test is a post-hoc method for adjusting 
Significance levels In ANOVA and is considered 
to be a I conservative' test, tending to err on 
the side of underestimating significance (Vogt, 
1993, p. 204). It is a test that is used often, is 
known to work well In cases with unequal cell 
sizes, and will provide specific information on 
which means are significantly different from each 
other. These results are presented In the 
discussion below. 
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Research question 1: Investor comfort 
Many critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have stated 
that its sole purpose was to restore investor 
confidence in the market without any substantive 
improvements in the governance of corporations. 
One of the survey questions specifically asked if the 
CEO and CFO certification will give investors a 
greater sense of comfort following the Enron 
collapse. A univariate ANOVA was conducted by 
constituent groups. The ANOVA was significant 
with FI. 303 (0.05) =8.54, P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis 
using the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean 
differences. Bankers had higher mean scores 
compared to internal auditors, CFAs, and 
accounting educators. In addition, CPAs had 
higher mean scores compared to educators. Lower 
scores indicate agreement with the statement that 
the certification requirement would give jittery 
investors a greater sense of comfort in unstable 
financial times. The means and standard deviations 
for RQ1 are presented in Table 3. 
The first research question revealed that there 
were significant mean differences by the creditor 
and the accountant constituent groups. Bankers 
had significantly higher mean scores than internal 
auditors, CPAs, and educators. One possibility for 
these results is that bankers believe that the 
purpose of the legislation was not merely to coddle 
jittery investors and that the certification 
requirement will bolster the credibility and 
truthfulness of the financial statements that they 
use every day. Another possible explanation could 
indicate that bankers believe the purpose of the 
certification requirement was to calm investors but 
that it may not be completely effective in doing so. 
Likewise, CPAs also had significantly higher 
mean scores than educators. While both groups 
were considered the accountant constituent, 
accountants in public practice and accountants in 
education have a very different perspective. Public 
practice involves the practical application of 
accounting pronouncements while accounting 
education can be more theoretical. It is not 
Table 3: Means and standard deviations for RQI-RQ7 
Research question Bankers CFAs CPAs Educators 11ltenlal 
auditors 
RQl: Investor comfort 
Means 3.37 2.55 2.88 2.27 2.54 
SD 1.04 1.11 1.18 0.94 1.08 
II 51.00 47.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ2: Control consciousness 
Means 2.96 2.53 2.91 2.37 2.27 
SD 0.94 0.95 1.15 1.10 1.03 
II 51.00 47.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ3: Report accuracy 
Means 3.70 3.55 3.95 3.90 3.51 
SD 1.10 1.05 0.99 1.01 1.12 
11 51.00 47.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ4: Management representation letter 
Means 2.61 3.36 3.38 3.69 3.81 
SD 1.18 1.13 1.24 1.12 1.22 
11 51.00 47.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ5: Costibenefit 
Means 2.34 3.04 3.31 3.50 3.44 
SD 1.04 1.19 1.15 1.18 1.11 
II 50.00 46.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ6: Unable to know 
Means 2.31 2.48 2.50 2.56 2.84 
SD 1.14 1.10 1.19 1.08 1.20 
II 50.00 46.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
RQ7: Executive personal liability 
Means 1.86 1.89 2.25 2.43 2.20 
SD 0.80 0.66 0.86 0.93 0.86 
II 50.00 47.00 60.00 62.00 88.00 
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surprising that CPAs may be more skeptical of the 
effectiveness of the Act than were educators. As 
with the banking constituents, it is possible that 
CPAs believe that the Act's underlying purpose was 
more substantive than has been portrayed in the 
financial press. It is also possible that CPAs believe 
that the Act will give management the impetus to 
improve the quality and transparency of their 
corporate financial reporting. On the other hand, it 
could also indicate that CPAs believe that the 
purpose of the Act was, in fact, to soothe nervous 
investors but that this goal may not be achieved 
through the certification requirement. For both the 
banking and CPA constituent groups, further 
research needs to be conducted to determine the 
specific reasons for these constituent groups' 
dissatisfaction with the certification requirement. 
Research question 2: Control consciousness 
Proponents of the Act argue that through the 
process of implementing the provisions of the 
Act, corporations will become better at identifying 
risks. It would also make the corporations 
more internal control conscious. One question in 
the survey asked the constituent groups if 
the CEO / CFO certification would improve the 
entity's risk identification process and enhance 
control consciousness throughout the organization. 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted by 
constituent groups. The ANOVA was significant 
with F.1. 303 (0.05) =5.80, P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis 
using the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean 
differences. Bankers had higher mean scores than 
internal auditors and accounting educators. In 
addition, CPAs had higher mean scores than 
internal auditors. Lower mean scores indicate 
agreement with the statement that the Act will 
improve internal control consciousness and the risk 
identification process. The means and standard 
deviations for RQ2 are presented in Table 3. 
The second research question concentrated on 
the idea that the Act would make the management 
of a corporation more control conscious. 
Management would become better at identifying 
the risks that threaten the existence and prosperity 
of the organization. In so doing, management could 
take the appropriate steps to mitigate or even 
eliminate some of these risks. However, RQ2 
also revealed that bankers and CPAs once again 
had significantly different views from the other 
constituent groups. Bankers had significantly 
different mean scores than internal auditors and 
educators and CPAs had higher mean scores than 
internal auditors. 
It appears that bankers are skeptical concerning 
the certification's impact on the company's risk 
analysis process. Perhaps the results are due to 
the nature of the banking industry, in that 
bankers use financial statements to evaluate the 
creditworthiness of a particular business. During 
the course of that credit evaluation, bankers, like 
management, also evaluate the potential risks that 
a company may face in order to determine the risk 
of insolvency by the potential debtor. Perhaps 
bankers have already concluded that some 
companies are very good at risk analysis while 
others are not; this risk analysis process is a part of 
everyday business activities in a global market. 
Consequently, the certification requirement, in 
regard to risk analysis and control consciousness, is 
either redundant or ineffective. 
Furthermore, CPAs appear more skeptical than 
internal auditors. The results of this test may be a 
result of the level of independence that the external 
auditor has had as opposed to the internal auditor 
as they are still employees of the corporation. The 
external auditor has always had more leverage 
where the audit client is concerned, and now 
Sarbanes-Oxley finally gives internal auditors the 
ability to require that the company enforce the 
sound internal control procedures that the internal 
auditor has been 'suggesting' for decades. As such, 
it would not be surprising that internal auditors 
would value the Act's influence on risk analysis and 
control consciousness more than the external CPA 
would. 
Research question 3: Report accuracy 
The stated purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 is to promote the accuracy and transparency 
of financial reports in the US. Some argue that 
making executive officers personally responsible 
for the corporation's reports will improve the 
accuracy and transparency of such reports. To that 
end, one question in the survey asked constituent 
groups if the CEO and CFO certification will 
ensure that the report does not contain any untrue 
statement or material fact or any omission of 
material fact. A univariate ANOVA was conducted 
by constituent groups. The ANOVA was not 
Significant with F.1. 303 (0.05) = 2.28, P< 0.060, and 
post-hoc tests revealed no significant mean 
differences between constituent groups. Higher 
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mean scores indicate disagreement with the survey 
question. The means and standard deviations for 
RQ3 are presented in Table 3. 
The third research question dealt with the ability 
of the Act to eliminate materially misstated financial 
statements. Participants were asked if the CEO / 
CFO certification requirement would ensure that 
no materially misstated financial statements would 
be issued. RQ3 was not supported as all five 
constituent groups disagreed with the idea that the 
certification requirement would guarantee that the 
financial statements are accurate. It seems apparent 
in the results of the survey that all parties involved 
with the financial statements realize or expect some 
misstated financial statements to 'slip through the 
cracks.' Regulation of financial markets had been 
in place for decades, yet Enron and Worldcom 
still occurred. Mere legislation is unable to cure the 
human race of greed and as such, Enron-like cases 
will occur again in the future. In this case, more 
legislation is unlikely to succeed where past 
legislation has failed. Certain individuals will 
choose to take illegal actions in spite of the 
consequences. If criminal prosecution is not 
already a deterrent to illegal action, adding a 
certification requirement is unlikely to change the 
results. The results of this survey appear to support 
this argument. 
Anti-certification questions 
Four questions in the survey instrument 
investigated the more negative aspects of the 
executive officer certification requirement. 
Specifically, the questions asked if the requirement 
was tuUl€cessary due to the management letter; if 
the costs outweigh the benefits; if the officers are 
incapable of knowing whether the information is 
accurate; and if the requirement will lead to various 
attempts by officers to shield personal assets from 
exposure to lawsuits. Responses were recorded on 
a five-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly agree, 
5 = Strongly disagree). 
Research question 4: Management 
representation letter 
Many critics of the Act felt that the provisions of 
the Act were unnecessary. It was already a crime 
to issue false financial statements, yet numerous 
fraudulent financial statements were issued 
anyway. As with the certification requirement, 
management already made these representations to 
the company's auditor making certification of the 
report unnecessary and redundant. One question 
in the survey asked constituent groups if 
certification is unnecessary because the officers 
already provide assurances to the auditor in the 
management representation letter. A univariate 
ANOVA was conducted by constituent groups. The 
ANOVA was significant with Fl. 303 (0.05) = 9.17, 
P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using the Scheffe Test 
revealed significant mean differences. Internal 
auditors, CFAs, CPAs, and educators all had higher 
mean scores than bankers. Lower mean scores 
indicate agreement with the statement that the 
management representation letter was sufficient. 
The means and standard deviations for RQ4 are 
presented in Table 3. 
Respondents were asked if the certification 
requirement was unnecessary given the fact that 
management was already required to sign a 
representation letter for the external auditor. Such 
representation letters include statements that 
management has clisclosed all information 
relevant to the audit of the financial statements to 
the auditor during the course of the audit. All 
constituent groups except bankers disagreed with 
the idea that the certification requirement was 
unnecessary because management has already 
Signed the management representation letter to 
the auditor. Bankers appear to believe that the 
management representation letter is enough. This 
response is consistent with the results of the 
previous research question. In the previous 
results, bankers had less confidence in the Act's 
ability to restore confidence in the market, to help 
the risk analysis process, or to improve the 
accuracy of the financial statements. In this case, 
the results suggest that bankers believe that the 
certification requirement adds little additional 
credibility to the financial statements beyond what 
was already gained through the management 
representation letter. It does not necessarily 
indicate that bankers have any confidence in the 
management representation letter to the auditor. It 
just inclicates that they are no more confident in 
the financial statements after the certification 
requirement than they were when management 
was just signing a representation letter for the 
auditor. In fact, it is entirely possible that bankers 
were dissatisfied with the system then and are 
still dissatisfied with the system now. The 
certification requirement has done little to 
increase their confidence in the financial reporting 
process. 
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Research question 5: Costlbenefit 
As many executive officers come from 
management or marketing positionsf it is 
conceivable that they may not possess the requisite 
knowledge base to actually certify the reports as 
required by the Act. Training CEOs and CPOs in 
order that they may competently certify the report 
requires a significant amount of time and effort. 
Even if they are familiar with accounting control 
procedures in such depth to make the certification 
creclible, it will still require an inordinate amount 
of time and effort to complete the work necessary 
in order to certify the financial reports. One 
question on the survey asked if the CEO/CPO 
certification will be arduous and time-consuming 
such that the costs will outweigh the benefits. A 
univariate ANOVA was conducted by constituent 
groups. The ANOVA was significant with 
F.1. 301 (0.05) = 9.60, P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using 
the Scheffe Test revealed significant mean 
differences. Internal auditors, CPAs and accounting 
educators all had higher mean scores than bankers. 
Higher mean scores indicate disagreement with the 
statement that the costs will outweigh the benefits. 
The means and standard deviations for RQ5 are 
presented in Table 3. 
Responses to RQ5 reveal significant mean 
differences between internal auditors, CPAs, 
educators, and bankers. The means of the other 
constituent groups are higher than that of bankers 
which suggests that bankers are more in agreement 
with the idea that the cost of the certification 
requirement exceeds the benefits. 1he other 
constituent groups appear to believe the benefits of 
the certification requirement are worth the cost. 
Once again, the results of this research question are 
consistent with the previous results. As bankers do 
not believe that the certification requirement adds 
much value concerning credibility of the financial 
statements or improvements in the internal 
governance mechanisms of the corporation, it 
stands to reason that the banking constituent group 
would also feel that the cost of implementation 
would necessarily exceed its benefit On the other 
hand, it is also not surprising that internal auditors 
would feel that the cost was justified. As discussed 
previously, internal auditors gain a certain amount 
of enforcement leverage with their employer 
corporation that may have been absent prior to the 
passage of the Act. As such, the benefits to them 
far outweigh the costs of implementation. The 
interesting results for this research question, 
however, relate to educators. Educators really have 
no vested interest in the cost. They are not paying 
for it and they are not being paid for it At least 
CPAs will reap the benefits of the increased costs 
which somewhat explains their response. 
Compliance costs related to the Act, especially in 
the first year, can be staggering. Now CPAs 
conduct an audit of the internal control system in 
addition to the financial statement audit. Such 
audits can create a whole new revenue stream for 
CPAs that did not exist prior to the Act. Educators, 
however, have no reason to believe that the cost 
is justified unless they really do believe that the 
certification requirement will improve the financial 
reporting process. That result would be consistent 
with the results of previous research questions in 
this paper. Educators appear inclined to believe 
that the certification requirement may help to calm 
nervous investors and improve the corporation's 
risk analysis procedures as well as to increase 
credibility of the financial reports beyond what 
was reqUired solely by the auditor before the 
certification requirement existed. The results of 
this research question are consistent with this 
viewpoint for accounting educators. 
Research question 6: Unable to kl10w 
In addition to the time-consuming nature of the 
work required for certification, there is some 
question as to whether it is even possible for 
executive officers to make this certification. This 
question on the survey asked constituent groups if 
CEOs and CPOs will be incapable of actually 
knowing that there are no improprieties at some 
distant operations. A univariate ANOVA was 
conducted by constituent groups. The ANOVA was 
not significant, with F.l, 303 (0.05) = 1.96, P< 0.099, 
and post-hoc tests revealed no significant mean 
differences between constituent groups. Lower 
mean scores indicate agreement with the statement 
in the survey instrument. The means and standard 
deviations for RQ6 are presented in Table 3. 
RQ6 relates to the demanding nature of the 
certification requirement. Participants were asked 
if the financial officers would even be capable of 
knowing about control procedures in distant 
operations. All of the constituent groups agreed 
with lower mean scores. The results suggest 
that the parties involved with the Act recognize 
the inherent difficulties in the certification 
requirement. Based on those requirements, it may 
be impossible for the officers to do what is specified 
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in the Act, even if they wanted to do it. It may be 
that the demands of the Act are too unreasonable. 
However, it is clearly apparent why the 
certification requirement was placed in the Act All 
too many times we have seen corporate executives 
testify before Congress regarding areas of financial 
impropriety. Many of those testimonies blame the 
accountant. The CEO is just a figurehead with no 
knowledge of accounting rules and principles. The 
accountant should be held accountable for any 
impropriety in the financial statements. Yet, that 
defense is unacceptable. The massive cases of fraud 
that have occurred could not have taken place in 
the accounting department alone without the full 
knowledge of the financial officers. Congress 
wanted to force financial officers to take 
responsibility for the information that was being 
disseminated about the company. Consequently, 
the certification requirement is a reactionary 
and somewhat punitive measure. Participants 
acknowledge that it may be impossible for financial 
officers to actually know what the certification 
requirement demands, but they want them to try 
anyway. An executive that makes a good faith effort 
to understand and evaluate his or her own financial 
operations is far better than one who refuses to take 
any responsibility at all. It seems that the market 
participants are tired of the plaUSible deniability 
excuse and now want a proactive executive that 
takes his or her duty to the public very seriously. 
Research question 7: Executive personal liability 
The certification requirement makes the executive 
officers personally liable for the information that is 
reported. It is natural to assume that most executive 
officers will not want to expose their personal assets 
to the threat of shareholder lawsuits or federal 
prosecution. As such, these officers will be 
interested in developing methods to shield their 
personal assets from exposure. To accomplish this, 
Director's and Officer's (0&0) insurance had 
commonly been used, but the industry had 
observed increases in D&O insurance premiums 
by as much as 500 percent in 2002 (Isdale, 2005) 
and policy coverage was expected to be reduced. 
Therefore, additional methods had also been 
suggested, such as retitling assets, registering assets 
in a more favorable state, or the use of an asset 
protection trust (Isdale, 2005). Consequently, one 
question in the survey asked constituent groups if 
the certification will make executives personally 
responsible for their company's financial statements 
and will also create the desire for executives to 
shield their personal assets from shareholder 
lawsuits and federal prosecution. A univariate 
ANOVA was conducted by constituent groups. The 
ANOVA was significant with h 302 (0.05) = 4.67, 
P< 0.001. Post-hoc analysis using the Scheffe Test 
revealed significant mean differences. Educators 
had higher mean scores than bankers or CFAs. 
Higher scores indicate disagreement with the 
sentiment that officers will attempt to shield their 
personal assets. The means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 3 for RQ7. 
RQ7 deals with a very pragmatic issue. Do tl1e 
constituents believe that corporate executives 
would try to shield their personal assets because 
the certification requirement would make them 
personally liable for the financial statements? 
Would shielding personal assets become more 
important than ensuring the financial statements 
were as accurate as pOSSible? This research 
question was responded to with educators having 
Significantly higher mean scores than bankers or 
CFAs. Once again, these results are consistent with 
the results of the previous research question. 
Educators have consistently demonstrated a belief 
in the value of the certification requirement. 
The results of this study show that educators may 
believe that the certification requirement was 
necessary to restore confidence in the financial 
markets. Consequently, for this constituent group, 
the benefits of the legislation outweighed its 
cost While it was clear that educators, like the 
other constituent groups, did not believe that this 
provision would completely eliminate fraudulent 
or materially misstated financial statements, they 
do seem to conSistently view the provision in a 
more optimistic light, in general, as opposed to the 
banking constituent which consistently viewed the 
certification requirement more negatively. A 
summary of the results appears in Table 4. 
CONCLUSIONS 
nus study looks at one small piece of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the CEO/CFO 
certification requirement. Five different constituent 
groups were asked several questions regarding 
the requirement. The degree of consensus among 
the groups was used as a means to determine if the 
requirement achieved its objective. The results 
indicate that all five groups were skeptical about 
the requirement's impact or ability to ensure 
accurate financial statements. All five constituent 
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Table 4: Summary of results by research question 
RQl The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification Significant differences 
requirement gives investors a greater sense of comfort following the among groups 
Enran collapse. 
RQ2 The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification Significant differences 
requirement helps corporations become better at identifying risks and among groups 
controlling operations. 
RQ3 The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification 
requirement will ensure that no false or misleading financial statements 
All disagreed 
will be issued by corporations. 
RQ4 The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification Significant differences 
requirement was unnecessary because the same statements are made to among groups 
the auditor in the management representation letter. 
RQ5 The constituent groups will agree that the cost of the CEO/CFO Significant differences 
certification requirement will outweigh its benefits. among groups 
RQ6 The constituent groups will agree that the CEOs and CFOs cannot know All agreed 
what is happening at all their operations, especially in large, 
multinational companies. 
RQ7 The constituent groups will agree that the CEO/CFO certification Significant differences 
requirement will induce CEOs and CPOs to create new methods to among groups 
shield their personal assets from potential liability. 
groups also agreed that it was unlikely the CEOs 
and CFOs would have the necessary information 
from distant operations to even make a 
knowledgeable certification statement 
There were significant differences, however, in 
the other research questions. Bankers consistently 
differed from the other constituent groups 
concerning the purpose of the requirement, the 
risk assessment process, the necessity of the 
certification given the management representation 
letter, the costs relative to the benefits of the 
certification, and the personal liability issues of the 
officers. Their results are consistently negative 
across the research questions used in the study. It 
appears the bankers, as a constituent group, have 
little confidence in the certification requirement. 
hl addition, educators also differ Significantly in 
their responses to several of the research questions. 
Their results are conSistently more positive than 
some of the other constituent groups. lItis positive 
outlook may stem from the nature of their 
positions. Educators, in general, believe that people 
and society can be changed by training. Laws and 
regulations are a form of training where acceptable 
behavior is defined and unacceptable behavior is 
punished. As a result, it is not surprising that 
educators would view tlle Sarbanes-Oxley act in a 
more positive light 
Some limitations and additional observations 
also need to be mentioned. First of all, this study is 
based on survey research, and although every 
attempt was made during the execution and 
evaluation of results to minimize the potential for 
bias, such risk can never be totally eliminated. 
Secondly, this study was conducted before the 
current economic recession. It is possible, even 
probable, that results may be different in the 
current economic climate. It will be interesting to 
see whether profeSSionals will still place value on 
this certification, or if it will even continue to be 
issued conSidering current court cases questioning 
the legality of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements 
('Sarbanes-Oxley on Trial', 2009). And finally, the 
results concerning the banker constituent group 
are interesting. They are conSistently more 
pessimistic than other financial statement users. It 
seems that creditors would be more pleased about 
CEOs and CFOs taking responsibility for the 
financial statements than appears in this study. 
Additional research is warranted to determine the 
specific cause of these results. 
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